By August 2026, the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has morphed from a localised power struggle into a complex, multi-layered regional proxy battle. At the epicentre of this geopolitical shift sits Turkey.

While rumours of Turkish boots on the ground persist, open-source intelligence (OSINT) reveals a more subtle reality: Ankara has avoided direct combat intervention, opting instead to build an influential, multi-tiered defence partnership with the SAF.​

Through an examination of arms deals, high-level political summitry, strategic interests, and human rights implications, this analysis unpacks the true scope of Turkey's growing footprint in Sudan.​

The Evolution of Turkish Entanglement​

The relationship between Ankara and Khartoum did not originate with the April 2023 war. High-level political, economic, and security ties expanded rapidly during the rule of former President Omar al- Bashir.

Following his 2019 ouster, Turkey successfully preserved its diplomatic access to Sudanese state

institutions, laying the foundation for its current policy.

​Phase 1 – Diplomatic Caution (2023): Following the war's outbreak, Turkey relocated its embassy from Khartoum to Port Sudan while issuing official calls for ceasefires and Sudanese unity.

Phase 2 – Parallel Tracks & Defence Deals (2024–2025): Amnesty International documented Turkish light weapons in Sudan, while major investigations revealed over $120 million in defence deals between Baykar and the SAF alongside high-level security meetings in Ankara.

Phase 3 – Explicit Defence Partnership (Mid-2026): By June 2026, defence was formally listed as an official area of bilateral cooperation during presidential summits in Ankara attended by top intelligence officials.​

Categorising Turkish Military Support

To properly evaluate Ankara's involvement, military support must be categorised by its level of verification:

1. Traditional Armament (High Confidence): Pre-war and ongoing supplies of light weapons and munitions have been documented among SAF units and executive protection details.
2. Unmanned Aerial Systems (High Confidence): Multi-million-dollar defence deals with companies like Baykar brought Bayraktar-family drone systems to the SAF arsenal.
3. Technical & Operational Support (Medium–High Confidence): OSINT confirms the presence of Turkish defence contractors and technical teams inside Sudan for system maintenance, assembly, and operational support.
4. Official Ground Forces (Not Established): Available evidence does not reveal the deployment of active-duty Turkish combat units or operational command over SAF battlefields.​
5. The Impact of Drones on the Battlefield​: The introduction of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provided a major capability boost for the SAF, particularly during its 2024–2025 counter-offensives that led to the recapture of Wad Madani and central Khartoum.

However, attributing the SAF's strategic momentum solely to Turkish technology oversimplifies the field dynamics. ​Rather than single-handedly tipping the balance, Turkish technology acted as a force multiplier.

The SAF's battlefield progress was driven by a combination of key factors:

i. Aerial Systems Integration: Combining Turkish strike capabilities with Iranian Mohajer-6 UAVs.

ii. Force Reorganisation: Structural realignment within the regular armed forces.

iii. Ground Support: Mobilisation and participation of allied local armed formations.

iv. ​Opponent Attrition: Tactical splits and supply line shifts affecting the RSF.​

v. The Ideological Factor i.e., Realpolitik over Political Islam​: A central point of debate is whether Turkey’s policy is driven by ideological affinity with Sudanese Islamists. While former regime networks linked to the National Congress Party have actively mobilised to support the SAF and leveraged old channels in Ankara, evidence suggests ideology is a secondary enabler rather than the primary driver.

vi. Historical Connectors: Ex-Bashir regime figures retained commercial and diplomatic links

with Turkey, facilitating access.

vii. Primary Drivers: Ankara's choices are principally guided by hard realpolitik—securing Red Sea maritime access, opening defence export markets, and positioning for post-war reconstruction rights.

viii. State Institutions: Turkey aligns primarily with the sovereign state apparatus and military leadership under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, rather than an independent party ideology.

ix. ​Strategic Motivations: Why Sudan Matters to Ankara​Turkey’s long-term calculus extends far beyond current battlefield dynamics.

x. Red Sea Geopolitics: Securing a strategic foothold along the Sudanese coast (such as Suakin) positions Ankara favourably among competing regional powers.

xi. Defence Industry Expansion: Sudan provides an active market for Turkish defence firms, establishing long-term institutional reliance on Turkish maintenance, spare parts, and system upgrades.

xii. Economic Positioning: Ankara is laying the groundwork to dominate post-war reconstruction contracts across Sudan's infrastructure, energy, and agricultural sectors.​

xiii. Human Rights and Legal Implications​: The proliferation of drone warfare has dramatically escalated civilian casualties across Sudan. UN reports highlighted that aerial strikes accounted for over 80% of documented civilian deaths in early 2026.

xiv. Sanctions Scope: UN Security Council Resolution 1591 enforces an arms embargo specifically on Darfur, not a blanket nationwide embargo on Sudan.

xv. Corporate Due Diligence: Even though Turkey is not a state party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), defence manufacturers providing ongoing technical support in active conflict zones bear independent human rights due-diligence responsibilities as well as International Humanitarian Law obligations.

​Future Scenarios (6 to 18-Month Outlook)

Scenario 1: Consolidated Defence & Reconstruction (High Probability). Turkey maintains its defence support without deploying troops, gradually shifting focus toward securing post-war economic, energy, and port infrastructure agreements.

Scenario 2: Escalating Support Amid Prolonged War (Medium Probability). Continued RSF drone advancements push Ankara to deliver more advanced military hardware, increasing international human rights and humanitarian law scrutiny on Turkey.

Scenario 3: Pivot to Regional Mediation (Medium–Low Probability). Ankara attempts to leverage its ties with the SAF to act as a core peace broker, though its status as a defence partner may compromise its perceived neutrality.

​Final Verdict

​Turkey is not a direct combatant in Sudan, but it has solidified its position as an essential defence and political partner for the Sudanese Armed Forces. Ankara's multi-layered strategy successfully balances military aid, corporate defence expansion, and diplomatic manoeuvers—securing vital long-term influence in the Red Sea and East Africa well into the post-war era.

Kambal Abdelwahid Ahmed​ is a Sudanese journalist and regional affairs correspondent specializing in political, security, and humanitarian reporting across Sudan, Africa, and the Middle East.

Contact: kambalahmed01@gmail.com